The Big Idea
A helpful critical analysis of Melanchthon’s work on Dialectic and Rhetoric. I have pulled out selected quotes around how he treats and teaches memory.
His Reason for not treating memory directly
From De Rhetorica Libri Tres 2.2.2 pp. 48
Memoriam ac pronunciationem natura suppeditat, et in eis, quid ars possit, ex aliis autoribus disces.
Google translation: Nature supplies memory and delivery, and in these matters, you will learn what skill can achieve from other authors.
Alt Google Translation: Nature provides memory and delivery, and regarding what art can achieve in these areas, you will learn from other authors.
From Elementa Rhetorices PP. 276
Itaque nos de aliis duabus partibus nihil praecipiemus, quia memoria parum admodum ab arte adiuvatur.
Google Translation: Therefore, we will give no instructions about the other two parts, because memory is helped very little by art or method.
Advice on Making Commonplaces
From Elementa Rhetorices PP. 316-320
De locis communibus
Breviter complexi sumus communissima praecepta de inventione, de quibus ingentia volumina Graeci composuerunt. Verum ego non admodum opus esse longioribus praeceptis in hac parte iudico. Nam via quadam cognita, postea res non in libellis rhetoricis quaerendae erunt, sed tum a communi prudentia, tum ex aliis artibus sumendae. Etenim haec praecepta non tam ad inveniendum conducunt, quam ad eligendum idonea, cum res ex aliis artibus offeruntur. Deinde cum imitatio magis efficiat eloquentes, quam ars, praecepta traduntur adolescentibus ad hoc, ut adiuvent eos in legendis orationibus disertorum, quia aetas illa non potest longas causas animo complecti, nisi res et argumenta certis locis, quasi notis discernan|tur. Addemus autem ad inventionis praecepta unum quod maximam vim habet in omnibus disputationibus, videlicet, ut hypothesin transferamus ad thesin. Vocant autem hypothesin negotium de quo controversia est, circumscriptum circumstantiis, ut sit ne bellum movendum adversus Turcas. Thesin vocant generalem quaestionem, ut liceat ne Christiano bella gerere. Facile autem iudicari potest, cum de Turcico bello dicendum est, omnia pleniora atque uberiora fore, si a specie ad genus oratio transferatur, et de magistratus officio, de bello in genere dicatur, quam pium, quam sanctum officium reges faciant, si has gentes divinitus ipsorum tutelae commissas, adversus Turcicum latrocinium defendant. Hoc praecipiunt apud Ciceronem Antonius et Crassus, ut consideremus, qui loci communes haereant in causa, quorum alii totam causam continent, in quibus thesis versatur, alii incidunt obiter. Ac thesis illa cum habet peculiarem interdum in oratione locum, tum verba et sententias gignit in omnibus partibus orationis. Et praeter hanc varie alluditur ad alios locos, qui obiter incidunt, ut Cicero pro Milone, cum dicit Clodium deo propter violatas religiones poenas dedisse, alludit ad locum communem, et breviter | probat deum esse, et hunc mundum a deo | gubernari. Sed sumamus exempla ab ecclesiasticis contionibus, quae prorsus otiosae erunt, nisi ad praecipuos locos doctrinae Christianae referantur. Si quis enarret historiam Davidis, quomodo propter admissum adulterium a propheta obiurgatus sit, locus communis erit de poenitentia. Etsi enim et de adulterii turpitudine multa dici possunt, tamen delectus adhibendus est locorum, et excerpen- dus is, qui maxime proprius est doctrinae Christianae. Porro in hac historia, omnes poenitentiae partes egregie, depictae sunt. Habet enim non solum obiurgationem, sed etiam absolutionem, quam in sacris historiis praecipue quaerunt piae mentes. Ac Christus ipse docet nos hoc artificium, qui saepe transfert hypotheses ad theses, ut cum excusat Apostolos de violata traditione Pharisaeorum, incipit in genere de traditionibus illis contionari. Cum adfertur ad eum historia de crudelitate Pilati, gravissimam contionem habet de poenitentia, Lucae 13. Adhibentur autem loci communes et ad probandum et ad amplificandum. Etenim fere in omni proba- tione, maior nascitur ex aliquo communi loco. Idque diligenter observent studiosi, ut sciant ubi sit usus locorum communium, quos | qui prudenter eligit, is demum poterit et τὰ κοινὰ καινῶς, cum volet, et quod difficilius est τὰ καινὰ κοινῶς tractare. Ac voco locos communes, non tantum virtutes et vitia, sed in omni doctrinae genere praecipua capita, quae fontes et summam artis continent. Neque tamen omnibus ubique utimur. Sed unusquisque sciat se debere suae artis, praecipuos locos tenere, ut cum aliqua de re dicendum erit, statim offerant se idonei loci. Quidam putant se locos communes tenere, cum de variis rebus coacervatas senten- tias habent, quas passim ex poetis et oratoribus excerpserunt. Et quia iudicant hanc coacervationem insignium dictorum perfectam esse doctrinam, nihil habent consilii in legendis auctoribus, nisi ut inde tamquam flores, dicta quaedam decerpant. Interim nullam artem perfecte discunt, nullum scriptum totum intelligunt, nusquam totum orationis genus considerant. Hoc studium exiguam habet utilitatem, et hoc nomine plurimum nocet, quia in stultis doctrinae persuasionem parit, qua nihil est perniciosius. Sciendum est igitur, ita locos communes recte cognosci, si artes illae in quibus versantur, perfecte cognitae fuerint. Et ut locos communes apte in causis intertexere possimus, | opus erit perfecta eorum | cognitione. Verum quia in civilibus negotiis saepe existunt disputationes de virtutibus, de vitiis, de fortuna, de legibus, de consuetudine. Ideo rhetores horum locorum praecipue mentionem faciunt, qui tamen neque perfecte intelligi, neque copiose ac varie tractari possunt, nisi cognitis illis artibus, in quibus versantur. Quare necesse est ad bene dicendum addere studium omnium maximarum artium, philosophiae, doctrinae religionis, iuris et historiarum. Interim tamen hoc studium colligendi dicta scriptorum, habet aliquam utilita- tem, praesertim in adolescentia. Habent enim multa lumina verborum, et multas figuras, ut elegans metaphora est in versu de experientia: Discipulus est prioris posterior dies. Neque solum propter venustatem citantur, sed etiam propter auctoritatem, habent enim velut pondus testimonii, quia a magnis viris proditae sunt, sicut Virgilius Ennianos versus suo poemati propter gravitatem inseruit. Et Cicero multa citat, ut quamobrem ἐπιχάρμειον illud teneto nervos atque artus esse sapientiae, non temere credere. Ad haec pleraque dicta continent gravissima praecepta, quare non solum ad ornandum, sed | velut leges atque oracula ad confirmandum proferuntur, quale illud est apud Livium, de non mutanda forma rei publicae, et quod praesentia incom- moda dissimulanda sint, quia mutatio maiora mala paritura sit. Nota mala inquit optima, quod a Plauto sumptum est, et Graeci μὴ κινεῖν κακὸν εὖ κείμενον. Interdum etiam breve aliquod dictum, ita rem definit, ut magis ostendat eam, quam prolixe disputationes philosophorum, ut definitio legis apud Demosthenem. Quare haec diligentia colligendi sententias, non solum verborum copiam alit, sed nonnihil etiam ad rerum cognitionem conducit. Sed tamen ut copiose ac varie tractari loci communes possint, accedere oportet ex ipsis artibus perfectam doctri- nam. Ceterum ad colligendas sententias etiam adhibenda est ratio quaedam. Nam et memoria adiuvabitur, cum ordine distribuerimus eas in certas classes, et haec distributio rerum inter se ordinem ostendet. Est autem et haec quaedam pars eruditionis, rerum ordinem, initia, et progressiones videre. Optima autem in distribuendo oeconomia erit, si sequemur artium discrimina. Cavendum est enim, ne confundantur artes, sed observandum, qui loci sint theolo|gici, qui sint phi|losophici. Ac philosophici possunt peti ex partibus hominis, ratio, artes, prudentia, virtus, affectus, consuetudo, corpus, forma, aetas, fortuna, divitiae, oeconomia, coniugium, educatio liberorum, politia, magistratus, lex, bellum, pax. Facile est autem genera partiri, et videre, quae sententiae, quae exempla, quae similitudines, in qualibet specie collocari debeant. De hac ratione annotandi extat Rodolphi Agricolae epistola, quam velim adolescentibus proponi ad verbum ediscendam.Google Translate:
Concerning commonplaces
We have briefly summarized the most common precepts concerning invention, concerning which the Greeks have composed massive volumes. But I judge that there is no great need for longer precepts in this part. For once a certain method is known, afterwards matters will not need to be sought in rhetorical handbooks, but rather drawn partly from common prudence and partly from other arts. Indeed, these precepts conduce not so much to discovering as to suitably selecting when matters are offered from other arts. Next, since imitation makes people eloquent rather than art, precepts are handed down to adolescents for the purpose of helping them in reading the speeches of eloquent men, because that age group cannot grasp long causes in their minds unless matters and arguments are discerned by fixed locations, as if by marks.We will add, however, to the precepts of invention one thing that has the greatest force in all discussions, namely, that we translate a hypothesis into a thesis. Now they call a hypothesis a specific matter about which there is controversy, circumscribed by circumstances, such as whether a war ought to be waged against the Turks. They call a thesis a general question, such as whether it is permitted for a Christian to wage wars. And it can easily be judged, when one has to speak about the Turkish war, that everything will be fuller and richer if the speech is transferred from the species to the genus, and spoken about the office of a magistrate and about war in general—how pious, how holy an office kings perform if they defend these nations, divinely committed to their protection, against Turkish brigandage.
This Antonius and Crassus enjoin in Cicero: that we consider what common topics adhere in a case, some of which contain the whole case (in which the thesis turns), while others occur by the way. And that thesis, while it sometimes has a peculiar place in a speech, then gives birth to words and sentences in all parts of the speech. And besides this, various allusions are made to other topics that occur by the way, as Cicero in Pro Milone, when he says that Clodius paid the penalty to God on account of violated sanctities, alludes to a common topic, and briefly proves that God exists and that this world is governed by God.
But let us take examples from ecclesiastical sermons, which will be entirely idle unless they are referred to the chief topics of Christian doctrine. If someone were to recount the history of David—how he was rebuked by the prophet on account of the adultery he committed—the common topic will be about repentance. For although many things can also be said about the foulness of adultery, nevertheless a choice must be employed, and that one excerpted which is most proper to Christian doctrine. Furthermore, in this history, all parts of repentance are exceedingly well depicted. For it has not only the rebuke, but also the absolution, which pious minds especially seek in sacred histories. And Christ Himself teaches us this art, who often transfers hypotheses to theses, as when He excuses the Apostles concerning the violated tradition of the Pharisees, He begins to discourse generally about those traditions. When the story about the cruelty of Pilate is brought to Him, He holds a most serious discourse concerning repentance in Luke 13.
Now common topics are employed both for proving and for amplifying. Indeed, in almost every proof, a major premise arises from some common topic. And students should diligently observe this so that they may know where the use of common topics lies; he who prudently chooses them will at length be able to treat common things in a novel way (tà koina kainōs), when he wishes, and what is more difficult, novel things in a common way (tà kaina koinōs).
And I call common topics not only virtues and vices, but in every kind of doctrine, the chief heads that contain the sources and the sum of the art. Nor yet do we use all things everywhere. But let everyone know that he ought to hold the chief topics of his art, so that when something needs to be spoken about, suitable topics immediately offer themselves.
Some think they hold common topics when they have sentences heaped together concerning various things, which they have excerpted here and there from poets and orators. And because they judge this heap of notable sayings to be perfect learning, they have no plan in reading authors except to pluck out certain sayings from them like flowers. Meanwhile, they learn no art perfectly, they understand no writing fully, they nowhere consider the whole genre of a speech. This study has small utility, and by this name it does much harm, because it produces a persuasion of learning in foolish minds, than which nothing is more pernicious. It must therefore be known that common topics are rightly understood if the arts in which they dwell are perfectly known. And so that we may be able aptly to interweave common topics in cases, there will be need of a perfect knowledge of them.
Yet because in civil business disputes often arise concerning virtues, vices, fortune, laws, customs, therefore rhetoricians make mention especially of these topics, which nevertheless can neither be perfectly understood nor copiously and variously treated unless those arts in which they dwell are known. Wherefore it is necessary for speaking well to add the study of all the greatest arts: philosophy, the doctrine of religion, law, and histories.
Meanwhile, however, this study of collecting the sayings of writers has some utility, especially in youth. For they have many lights of words, and many figures—such as the elegant metaphor in the verse concerning experience: ‘The later day is the disciple of the prior.’ Nor are they cited only on account of gracefulness, but also on account of authority; for they have as it were the weight of testimony because they have been handed down by great men, just as Virgil inserted Ennian verses into his own poem on account of their gravity. And Cicero cites many things, as why you should hold that famous Epicharmian saying: ‘Not to believe rashly is the sinews and joints of wisdom.’ To this, most sayings contain very grave precepts; wherefore they are brought forward not only for ornament, but as if laws and oracles for confirmation, such as that saying in Livy concerning not changing the form of the republic, and that present inconveniences must be dissimulated because change will produce greater evils—‘Known evils,’ he says, ‘are best,’ which is taken from Plautus, and the Greeks say mē kinein kakon eu keimenon (‘do not move a well-placed evil’).
Sometimes also some brief saying defines a matter so that it displays it more than the prolix disputes of philosophers, such as the definition of law in Demosthenes. Wherefore this diligence in collecting opinions not only nourishes an abundance of words, but also contributes somewhat to the knowledge of things. But nevertheless, so that common topics may be treated copiously and in various ways, a perfect doctrine derived from the arts themselves must be added.
Furthermore, a certain method must also be employed for collecting opinions. For memory will be aided when we have distributed them in order into certain classes, and this distribution of things will show the order among themselves. Moreover, this too is a certain part of learning: to see the order, beginnings, and progressions of things. The best economy in distributing will be if we follow the distinctions of the arts. For care must be taken lest the arts be confused, but it must be observed which topics are theological, which are philosophical. And philosophical ones can be sought from the parts of a man: reason, arts, prudence, virtue, affects, custom, body, form, age, fortune, riches, economy, marriage, education of children, polity, magistrate, law, war, peace. And it is easy to divide the genera and see which opinions, which examples, which similitudes ought to be placed in any given species. Concerning this method of annotating, there exists an epistle of Rudolph Agricola which I would wish to be proposed to adolescents to be learned word for word.”
NOTE
Mentioned Letter from Agricola can be found here: Rudolph Agricola - De Formando studio Epistola ad Jac. Barbirianum.pdf
Reapeated advice of how to integrate learning
From Epistola Senecae de ratione atque studii. PP. 376-377
Idem in his, quibus aluntur ingenia praestemus, ut quaecumque hausimus, non patiamur integra esse, ne aliena sint, sed concoquamus illa, alioquin in memoriam ibunt, non in ingenium. Assentiamur illis fideliter, et nostra faciamus, ut unum quoddam fiat ex multis, sicut unus nume|rus fit ex singulis, cum minores summas et dissidentes computatio una comprehendit, hoc faciat animus noster.
Melanchthon quotes from Seneca the Younger, Epistulae Morales ad Lucilium, 84.7–8:
Google Translate:
Let us do the same in those matters by which our intellects are nourished, so that whatever we have absorbed, we do not allow to remain intact, lest it stay foreign to us, but let us digest it; otherwise, it will go only into our memory, and not into our intellect. Let us thoroughly assimilate those things, and make them our own, so that a single unified whole may emerge from many parts—just as a single number is formed from individual digits when one calculation encompasses smaller and distinct sums; let our mind do this very thing.